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“That’s not the issue”: against a lightweight interpretation of 
ontological disputes 
 
A significant number of papers have been published recently on the use of metalinguistic 
negotiations in giving deflated analyses of ontological disputes. The philosophers who 
have authored these papers are Delia Belleri (Belleri 2017), Mirco Sambrotta (Sambrotta 
2019) and Amie L. Thomasson (Thomasson 2017). Stemming from different semantic 
analyses but similar metaontological commitments, these three philosophers have given 
an account of ontological disputes as metalinguistic negotiations, specifically, 
metalinguistic negotiations with metaontological deflationist commitments. 
Metalinguistic negotiations are those metalinguistic disputes which consist in normative 
debates about what a word should mean (Plunkett 2015, 837), metalinguistic disputes 
being those in which at least one of the disputants make a metalinguistic usage of a term 
(Plunkett 2015, 835). 
 
The objective of this interpretation of ontological disputes has been made explicit by 
Thomasson (Thomasson 2017, 20). This consists of two aims: firstly, maintaining 
deflationist metaontological commitments and, secondly, making sense of what 
disputants are doing in relation to their ontological disagreement. As for the first purpose, 
maintaining deflationist commitments is to avoid any understanding of ontology in which 
this branch of knowledge is a sort of scientific enterprise, in the sense that ontologist work 
consists of discovering certain ontological facts of the world. 
 
Regarding the second objective, what these deflationist philosophers intend is to make 
sense of the intuition that ontological parties are having a disagreement (Belleri 2017, 
2215), which means making sense of what disputants are doing (Thomasson 2017, 20).  
In conclusion, what these philosophers intend is to give an account of ontological disputes 
that maintain their cognitive value without having to resort to polemical thesis on 
metaphysics and epistemology. 
 
The three readings (by Mirco, Delia and Thomasson) that are using metalinguistic 
negotiations to interpret ontological disputes have much in common. All of them share 
what I call “lightweight interpretation of ontological disputes” (hereinafter LIOD). 
Throughout this paper, I will defend that LIOD does not work with most ontological 
debates. The main reason for this is that, contrary to what its proponents think, LIOD 
does not account for what participants are doing in these disputes. 
 
In order to demonstrate so, I will use an argument which has analogies with “What’s at 
issue?” (Gibbard 2008, 23) argument by Moore: the “That’s not the issue” argument. I 
will use this argument against two possible applications of LIOD to classical ontological 
disputes, “Do numbers exist?” and “Does free will exist?”. This will show the inadequacy 
of LIOD as an interpretation criterion for ontological disputes. 
 
1. Metalinguistic negotiations 
 
Plunkett defines a metalinguistic negotiation as a normative metalinguistic dispute 
(Plunkett 2015, 837). A metalinguistic dispute is a dispute in which at least one of the 
disputants uses a metalinguistic usage of a term, meaning that the disputant uses the term 
in order to say something about its meaning, or its correct usage (Plunkett 2015, 834). In 
the case of metalinguistic negotiations, this metalinguistic usage expresses how a term 
should be, or not should be, used in terms of the fulfilling of some value or values that 
are stated, explicitly or implicitly, as those to be pursued in a certain context.  
 
An example of metalinguistic negotiation that is always used in the literature is a dispute 
in which the parties elucidate if a famous racehorse called “Secretariat” is one of the 
greatest athletes of the twentieth century. Suppose that this dispute moves to the next 
couple of assertions: 
 
A: Secretariat is an athlete. 
 
B: Secretariat is not an athlete. 
 
If we suppose that both disputants agree in every relevant property instantiated by 
Secretariat, in the actual meaning of the word “athlete”, and we still think that there is a 
real disagreement here, this is a metalinguistic negotiation: one which concerns  how we 
should or should not use the term “athlete”. This means that metalinguistic negotiations 
on “X” (“athlete”) are about answering the question of which concept of X (ATHLETE or 
ATHLETEE) must be employed1. In this particular case, the question is what concept 
should we associate with the term “athlete”, thus making or not worthy of respect every 
animal which, as Secretariat, instantiates certain characteristics. This disagreement could 
continue by A giving moral reasons to explain how certain animals should be recognized 
as athletes, or aesthetic reasons to support the thesis that a specific aesthetical feature of 
 
1 Following Burgess and Plunkett (Burgess and Plunkett, 2013), concepts are named with small caps.  
horses, justifies broading of  the meaning of the term “athlete” to include certain horses 
in it.  
In any case, there is a metalinguistic negotiation going on. The dispute would be a 
metalinguistic negotiation so long as the thesis over which is the concept that we should 
associate with certain term, are expressed by a metalinguistic use of this term, rather than 
citing it. In this context, the reasons that are used in a metalinguistic negotiation, have to 
be read as giving their logical support, not to certain conflicting wordly issues (that 
Secretariat is or is not an athlete), but to a conclusion concerning which concept 
(ATHELETE or ATHLETEE) we should attach to the relevant term. 
 
Finally, is important to note that metalinguistic negotiations are implicit conceptual ethics 
debates (Burgess and Plunkett 2013, 109). A debate in conceptual ethics is a normative 
dispute concerning the use of concepts. In this sense, is natural that all metalinguistic 
negotiations are constituted, as every normative dispute, by arguments that try to 
demonstrate that some action (this time conceptual choices) is the one which best satisfies 
some set of values and/or purposes which are the most relevant in deciding what to do.   
 
2. Lightweight interpretation of ontological disputes 
 
An ontological dispute is a type of philosophical dispute in which conflicting answers are 
given to the question “Do Xs exist?” In this context, LIOD consists of two theses: 1) 
ontological disputes are metalinguistic negotiations and 2) they are concerned with the 
pursuit of practical objectives and not with discoveries eminently metaphysical.  
 
The former thesis requires interpreting ontological disputes as metalinguistic 
negotiations. However, in these metalinguistic negotiations the question is, instead of 
which concept we should use for a given term, if a certain term has to be used at all (*). 
Therefore, under LIOD, when disputants say “There are numbers” or “There are no 
numbers” what they really are communicating is “We should use number terms” and “We 
shouldn’t use number terms” respectively. Of course, defending some use of a term  (“free 
will”), is to defend a specific concept attached to it; normally this implies a decision 
among other alternatives: for example, saying “Free will exists” in order to defend the 
concept of COMPATIBILIST FREE WILL instead of FOLK FREE WILL. 
 
As for the second thesis, these debates concern the pursuing of practical objectives, so 
that arguing for conceptual tools is never realized towards the discovery of metaphysical 
facts. Under this view, ontologists do not discuss which concept carves nature at the joints 
(Sider 2011) or represents what “really” exists in any other similar way. For this reason, 
LIOD is the interpretation criterion for ontological disputes that is used by 
metaontological deflationists to give an account of the nature of ontological disputes. An 
example of this type of goal could be fighting against racial discrimination (Haslanger 
2012), or employing the most efficient, clear and fruitful language in some domain of 
investigation, in a way similar to Carnap in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” 
(Carnap 1956).  
 
To sum up, under LIOD, we have one disputant who argue for the use of a term, hence, 
to some concept associate with it, because it is seen as the best action for fulfilling certain 
practical purpose; and we have another disputant who argue, through normative reasons, 
against the use of that term at all. 
 Some disputes can be seen as practical metalinguistic negotiations correctly interpreted 
by LIOD. Consider two disputant A and B. Both disputants agree in the fact that there is 
not any natural kind that difference between human groups and can be called “race”, 
however, they have the following dispute: 
 
A: There are races because there is racial discrimination. 
 
B: I understand the type of discrimination that you have in mind, but there are no races. 
Saying that there are is to be with racist people. 
 
This dispute could be successfully interpreted by LIOD as a metalinguistic negotiation 
concerning the term “race”, where one of the disputants argue for the use of the term by 
attaching to it certain concept (SOCIOLOGICAL RACE), and the other argues against using 
that term at all. A defends that her use of the term “race” is the one which best fits the 
aim of fighting racial discrimination, while B argues against using this term at all2.  
 
Assuming that this is not all the dispute, once we arrive at the conclusion that this is a 
metalinguistic negotiation and with information concerning contextual factors and other 
utterances, we could reach through LIOD to the most caritative reading of this dispute: 
this would imply an assignation of practical reasons to the agents involved in this dispute 
that support their respective conceptual ethics thesis on the use of the term in question. 
For example, it could be assigned to A the claim that we have to assign the concept 
 
2 Sally Haslanger’s work (Haslanger 2012) aligns with this analysis. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL RACE to our use of the term “race” because it correctly tracks the 
phenomena that we usually call “racial discrimination”, which is essential to fight against 
it. On the other hand, it could be assigned to B the claim that we do not have to use the 
term “race”, because that would amount, in some sense, to sustain the ideology behind 
the phenomena of racial discrimination. Of course, determining which specific set of 
practical reasons is assigned depends also on other additional theses added to LIOD (a 
LIOD’s extension), as LIOD consist in two thesis that cannot give a complete 
interpretation of concrete ontological disputes. 
 
Its seems hard not to think that,  in disputes that could be correctly interpreted through 
LIOD, most of the reasons that are actually used before the interpretation would have 
some reinterpretation through the assignation  of reasons that is given by this 
interpretation criterion; that is, only few reasons that are actually used by disputants 
would be discharged and not reinterpreted in any way by LIOD. 
Although the example from above shows that LIOD could be used in some cases, most 
ontological disputes are not of this kind. Normally, ontological disputes have to do with 
the existence of abstracta, possible worlds or moral properties. The reasons that are 
normally used in these disputes to defend the existence or non-existence of what is 
disputed are metaphysical instead of practical; the former reasons are not used to argue 
in favor of some conceptual choice that best fulfills certain practical objectives, but  to 
state what really is the case or, in case we have a metalinguistic negotiation with 
metaphysical commitments, if a concept should be used to speak in terms that carve 
nature at the joints (Sider 2011) or genuinely reflects the world in some other way. 
 
 In this context, by metaphysical reasons I understand those reasons that try to prove states 
of facts about certain objects as substances, properties, values, possible worlds or 
abstracta, considering them as things that are in the world and not just related to our 
conceptual schemes or linguistic structures. This is also the case when a disputant uses 
metaphysical reasons in metalinguistic negotiations, as long as those reasons are used to 
argue for some concept to be the one that represent most closely how the world really is. 
Disputants who give these reasons see themselves as taking on a task similar to that of 
science, namely, describing the world on some of its aspects. Metaphysical reasons are 
familiar tools for every standard metaphysician.  
 
This being the case, when LIOD is applied to interpret ontological debates where 
metaphysical reasons are being used, it interprets the debate as a metalinguistic 
negotiation, but also and more importantly, substitutes metaphysical reasons for practical 
ones: metaphysical reasons cannot be accepted by LIOD as such, as long as these reasons 
are not the type of reason that is used in order to argue for a practical aim, in the sense 
stated above. By using this reinterpretation on most debates in ontology (those were 
disputants use metaphysical reasons), LIOD proponents believe to be making sense of the 
disputants’ intentions, explaining what disputants in most ontological disputes would 
have literally communicated if they knew how their words work.   
 
However, LIOD does not make sense of what disputants in most ontological disputes are 
doing because it does not capture what is “at issue” between them. Explaining this will 
be my aim in the next section. 
 
3. That’s not the issue 
 Before putting forward my argument, I would like to consider a similar one: the “What’s 
at issue?” (Gibbard 2008) argument given by Moore. This  argument seeks to demonstrate 
that “good” cannot be reduced to any natural or supernatural property. The argument 
consists in stating that if “X is good” is the same that for X to instantiate some property, 
we couldn’t make sense of the disagreement between disputants which have different 
theories on what is good. Suppose that A is a utilitarian and B a Kantian deontologist. 
They have the following dispute: 
 
A: To lie is sometimes good. 
 
B: To lie is never good, but sometimes produces the biggest amount of pleasure. 
 
Here, we have a disagreement. However, if it was the case that “good” meant “what 
produces the biggest amount of pleasure,” it would be impossible to make sense of our 
strong intuitions to be in front of a disagreement: because B would be saying “To lie 
never produces the biggest amount of pleasure, but sometimes produces the biggest 
amount of pleasure”. The same applies to  any property that is claimed to mean the same 
as “good”. 
 
A very similar thing happens with the “That’s not the issue” argument, regarding the  
application of LIOD to ontological disputes when  disputants use metaphysical reasons. 
The “That’s not the issue argument” is an argument that shows that any type of 
substitution of metaphysical reasons with practical ones, made by any extension of LIOD, 
produce the impossibility of making sense of these ontological disagreements. The 
similarity between “what’s at issue?” and “that’s not the issue” is that both arguments 
demonstrate the falsity of a particular interpretation of certain items showing that, if this 
is the case, then we cannot give an account of certain situations when we are sure that 
there is a disagreement between two agents on some issue. 
 
Now, the argument. Imagine two disputants A and B. Concerning the question “Do 
mathematical objects exist?” A says that they exist because of the Fregean argument, B 
says that mathematical objects do not exist because of the epistemological argument. 
 
The Fregean argument (Linnebo 2018) is the argument which concludes the existence of 
numbers by means of two theses. The first one is that the singular terms in mathematical 
statements refer to mathematical objects. The second one is that mathematical statements 
are true. As from classical semantics, the truth of a statement requires that its singular 
terms refer successfully to objects and, therefore, mathematical objects exist. 
 
The epistemological argument (Linnebo 2018) states that mathematical objects cannot 
exist because, if they did, we would systematically know things about non-
spaciotemporal entities, which are completely disconnected from us in its abstract realm. 
 
Having this in mind, we have the following dispute: 
 
A: Mathematical objects exist because of the Fregean argument. 
 
B: I grant you that mathematical language is better for any practical concern than 
nominalistic one, but mathematical objects do not exist because of the 
epistemological argument. 
 
Here we have a disagreement; A says that mathematical objects exist, and B says that 
they do not. However, suppose we reinterpret this dispute through LIOD. By some 
extension of LIOD, this dispute is now a metalinguistic one: the dispute is really over the 
use of singular terms for mathematical objects3. A’s Fregean argument is substituted by 
an argument which defends that mathematical language is more efficient than 
nominalistic one, being “nomalistic language” understood as one in which there is no 
singular terms referring to mathematical objects. At the same time, B’s epistemological 
argument is now substituted by an argument which says that nominalistic language 
satisfies some set of aims better than mathematical language. If we do this, we cannot 
make sense of “what’s at issue” here: B is in contradiction with herself, as long as she 
asserts that nominalistic language satisfies some aims better than mathematical language 
and, at the same time, she says that mathematical language satisfies all aims better than 
nominalistic one. If B contradicts herself, there is no disagreement here. Hence, we can 
conclude that the reinterpretation of this debate does not track the disagreement, the issue 
in this dispute. This argument is independent of which specific interpretation is given by 
some LIOD extension of the metaphysical arguments that are in place: as long as B 
accepts that mathematical language is better in every practical task than nominalistic 
language, the argument remains the same. 
 
 
3 Singular terms for mathematical entities imply the use of lots of concepts, so speak in terms of a 
language is better than speak in terms of a concept (FIVE) assigned to every mathematical singular term. 
“That’s not the issue” shows that what B wants to say by the use of the epistemological 
argument cannot be substituted for any set of practical reasons in favor of nominalistic 
language. She does not use that metaphysical reason to say that nominalistic language is 
better for some task or another than mathematical language: B says that, even though 
mathematical language is better for everything, mathematical entities do not exist. 
 
We can also look at another example, now in other ontological debate: one concerning 
the existence of free will. 
 
Imagine two disputants A and B. Concerning the question “Does free will exist?” A says 
that it exists because of an argument from introspection. B says that free will does not 
exist because of the consequence argument. 
 
By “argument from introspection” (O’Connor, Timothy and Franklin 2020), I refer to a 
simple argument which points to the fact that we have inner experience concerning the 
performance of our own actions, which shows that we are free when we act, at least, under 
certain conditions. 
 
The “consequence argument” (O’Connor, Timothy and Franklin 2020), states that we live 
in a deterministic world and laws of nature and events that happened before we were born 
determine our present behavior. As long as this behavior was determined before our own 
existence, the argument continues, and we cannot change past nor natural laws, our 
behavior is not up to us, therefore, we are not free. 
 
The dispute: 
 A: Free will exist because of an argument from introspection. 
 
B: The concept of free will (FREE WILL) is the best for any practical aims that we have 
(as in law, ethics and political philosophy), specifically, is a necessary concept for 
assigning responsibilities, justifying punishment, and related issues (Thomasson 
2017, 16).  However, free will does not exist because of the consequence argument. 
 
 
Again, we have a disagreement; A says that free will exists and B says that it does not. 
Through some extension of LIOD, this is a dispute over the use of the term “free will”, 
with one party arguing for the use of the term with a specific concept of free will attached 
to it (FREE WILL4), and other arguing against any use of the term. LIOD’s extension 
substitutes the argument from introspection of A, for an argument which supports the use 
of “free will” as FREE WILL, arguing that the latter is an essential concept for making 
sense of individuals responsibility for their actions. Also, LIOD substitute the 
Consequence Argument of B by an argument which supports the thesis that we have 
abandon the use of that term, as long as it is useless, even harmful for some relevant 
practical aims. 
 
One more time, the disagreement has disappeared, B contradicts herself: she says that 
certain use of “free will” (FREE WILL) is the best for any relevant practical aim and, at the 
same time, she denies this proposition. Once more, the disagreement that we encountered 
before we applied LIOD has disappeared.  
 
4 In using the expression FREE WILL, I try to remain neutral in respect of the specific concept of free will 
that is being defended. 
 LIOD, again, does not tell us what the issue between A and B is. What I mentioned before 
regarding the replication of this argument for any other extension of LIOD, can be 
repeated here: what the agents want to say through their use of metaphysical reasons, 
cannot be reinterpreted by LIOD. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: LIOD is wrong 
 
These examples show not only that LIOD cannot be applied to two ontological debates, 
one concerning the existence of mathematical objects and the other the existence of free 
will, but also that LIOD is of no use for reinterpreting ontological disputes where 
metaphysical reasons are being used (which are most ontological disputes). Metaphysical 
reasons are not used to implicitly argue for the utility, efficiency, or satisfaction of some 
practical aim by one concept or another, but for stating what the case is in the ontological 
realm or, at least, to implicitly argue for the metaphysical truthfulness of one concept over 
another, if we are in a metalinguistic negotiation. In this sense what a disputant want to 
communicate when she use a metaphysical reason cannot be substituted by any set of 
practical ones. This being the case, it is easy to conclude that LIOD does not make sense 
of what disputants are doing in most ontological disputes. Therefore LIOD, as 
interpretation criteria for reinterpreting most ontological disputes, is wrong. 
 
Not making sense of what disputants in ontological debates are doing is a very important 
problem regarding deflationist stands in metaontology. It forces these metaontological 
positions to have a much more aggressive and non-caritative stance against a big amount 
of ontological disputes that are happening today and have been happening through the 
history of philosophy. As LIOD does not work, metaontological deflationists are saying 
that these apparent debates are not disagreements at all as these positions have lost their 
interpretation criteria for making sense of what disputants are doing in most ontological 
disputes. These are not good news for deflationism in metaontology. 
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